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~'Legal

WILLIAM B. SPONG, JR.

'Professiort
./

A Look Into the Future
EDITOR'S NOTE: Dean Spong delivered th e following
address at Law Day meetings of the Norfolk-PoTlsmouth
and Roanoke Bar Associations last May. H e has footnoted
the text of his talk to reflect subsequent developments.

THE custom of observing Law Day in the United
States had its inception several years ago as an answer
to May Day as celebrated in the Soviet Union and
other communist nations. Law Day has provided an
opportunity for members of the legal profession to
remind the American public that here the rule of law
prevails, that certain rights are assured under our system of justice and administered by an independent
judiciary with an adversary system for hearing civil
disputes and criminal charges. Often on Law Day,
speakers have dwelled upon the great documents that
comprise the foundation of our democracy. Virginians, despite their inherent modesty , have seldom
refrained from reminding others that Jefferson, Madison, Mason and Pendleton were the principal
contributors to those documents, that George Wythe
was the first law professor and that Wythe's pupil,
John Marshall, as Chief Justice, es tablished the principle of judicial review.
During our recent Bicentennial celebration, the late
Eppa Hunton and Martin Burks were commissioned to
prepare a resolution acknowledging the contribution
of Virginia's lawyers to the founding of the Republic.
These gentlemen were somewhat surprised to learn
that neither George Mason nor James Madison were
lawyers, but recovered to embrace them thusly: ..
"whereas other Virginians not formally admitted to
the bar but nonetheless through private study learned
in constitutional "law and governmental philosphy,
profoundly influencPd the nation 's history, etc. .. "
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One of the benefits of the Bicentennial celebration
has been a renewed interest by historians in the legal
rather than political careers of the great Virginians
who were practicing lawyers. It is comforting to those
who are timid about court appearances to learn that
Thomas Jefferson had a dread of arguing cases. It is
interesting to read of the lifelong rivalry between two
great lawyers, Edmond Pendleton and George Wythe.
Wythe often found Pendleton more than his match .
Once, after suffering a series of losses to Pendleton in
the General Court at Williamsburg, Wythe considered
giving up the practice of law to enter the ministry. A
Williamsburg wag admonished him that this would
provide no escape from Pendleton; that if Wythe did
become a minister, Pendleton would also take the
cloth, rise to the pulpit and out preach him. The rivalry
between these two splendid legal minds continued in
another context after Wythe became Virginia's first
Chancellor and Edmond Pendleton became first President of the Court of Appeals of Virginia. Having
appellate jurisdiction over the findings of the Chancellor, Pendleton reversed over half of the 150 appeals of
Wythe's decrees. But they were friends . With Jefferson ,
they wrote the forerunn er of what is today the Code of
Virginia. David Mays, Pendleton 's biographer, declined to speculate on Wythe 's thoughts when as a
pallbearer he helped carry his great rival to a last
resting place.
But enough of the past. It is fitting on Law Day that
we in the legal profession take stock of ourselves and,
while applauding the magnificent roles played in
American history by lawyers, consider the future of our
profession. This past decade has been marked by a
period of introspection by lawyers, judges. and law
schools, resulting in criticisms, often of one another.
Our examination of the profession ha.s been brought
about for several reasons. Aroused consumers, often
dissatisfied with lawyer's fees, have taken to the courts

to challenge sacred cows of the legal profession. Our
learned profession status has been questioned in assaults under the Sherman antitrust law and/ or
claiming first amendment protection. Perceptions of
public dissatisfaction with lawyers and our legal system have been confirmed by public opinion polls, one
taken here in Virginia.
We hear the Chief Justice of the United States at
home and abroad state that half of the trial advocates
appearing in the Federal Courts are incompetent. A
recent study by the Federal Court Center puts that
percentage at somewhat less. The judiciary and the
legal profession, faced with charges of incompetency,
have looked to the law schools as a source of their
discomfort. Federal judges in the Second Circuit advocated that lawyers must have successfully completed
courses in trial advocacy, evidence, ethics and civil
procedure to qualify in their courts. Some have questioned the value of the traditional case book method of
teaching law and demanded a more practical and clinical approach. As the judges have held forth, others
have been moved to observe that only four Federal
judges have been removed from office for cause in the
history of the Republic. I make these observations to
portray the atmosphere in which we are called upon to
consider methods of improving legal education, and
the level of competence of lawyers and judges. These
are times when some question the competency of lawyers , others question the intellectural elitism of legal
education, others demand lay participation in matters
involving judicial selection and disciplinary proceedings and others call for a method short of impeachment
for the removal of incompetent federal judges.
It is fair to say that our profession's record with
regard to regulation of the conduct and performance of
its members, and its hesitation about making legal
services more widely available, has resulted in public
reaction against powers of self-regulation traditionally
exercised. There has not yet been a full-fledged attack
on the unique powers of the legal profession, although
some will characterize Surety Title Insurance Company, Inc., v. Virginia State Bar, recently remanded by
the Fourth Circuit to await a determination by the
Supreme Court of Virginia of its role in the process
leading to unauthorized Practice of Law opinions, as
more than simple assault. The cases with complaints
that allege bar regulations and advisory opinions violate antitrust laws and abridge first amendment rights,
culminating in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, must also
be viewed as significant.
Consider the series of cases that have chipped away at
bar self-regulation, many decided upon facts and circumstances arising in Virginia. N.A.A.C.P. v. Button,
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(1963) and Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar (1964) set aside statutes, advisory
opinions and standards concerning ethics and unauthorized practice by holding that "collective activity
undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is
a fundamental right within the protection of the first
amendment." These decisions along with later holdings in Illinois and Michigan are the basis for group
legal services as they exist today, particularly closed
panel prepaid plans.
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar (1975) in which I
wryly submit all of us had a monetary interest, held, as
you know, that minimum fee schedules adopted by a
local bar association and buttressed by advisory ethics
opinions do not constitute state action, so as to exempt
such fee schedules from the provisions of the antitrusJ
laws.
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Surety Title, which I have previously mentioned, is a
case in which unauthorized practice of law opinions of
the Virginia State Bar that limit therightof certification
of land titles to lawyers are challenges as violative of
the Sherman Act. There are two questions which
should be addressed by the Supreme Court before bar
groups can determine the direction that regulation of
our profession will take.
First, how direct must legislative or judicial rule
making be to qualify for immunity as state action, as
activity compelled by the state acting as sovereign?
Must we have a statute? Or a specific rule or opinion
adopted by the state's highest court?l Second, is state
action exemption available if a Court perceives that the
harm of the anti-competitive restriction outweighs
purported public benefits?
Answers to these questions will help address the
underlying problems facing the bar today. To what
extent will the profession regulate itself and to what
extent will it be regulated by state and federal govern·
ment?
There are fundamental challenges to the Code of
Professional Responsibility that involve first amendment rights. The Bates decision authorizing truthful
advertising, including fees, for routine legal services,
following upon Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia
Consumer Council (1976) was decided on first amendment rights but addressed advertising and not in person
solicitation. In January Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association was argued before the Supreme Court in
which a disbarred Ohio lawyer claimed first amendment protection for soliciting clients in a hospital
room shortly after an accident. Counsel for the disbarred attorney relied largely upon Button and Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen. Should the Supreme
Court set aside the disbarment, and I do not believe they
will, we may be faced with a situation where, as in
advertising, standards will be applied by the various
states to set forth the circumstances under which lawyers may in person solicit clients. 2
The future of our profession will, in large measure,
depend upon public perception, for this will contribute to the climate in which legislative and judicial
decisions affecting the profession are made.
I have fallen into the academic habit of discussing
appellate cases. It is important that we recognize that
well over ninety percent of the complaints against
lawyers by the general public involve fee disputes,
procrastination by the lawyer, over-promise by the
lawyer, and conflicts of interest, often because of financial involvement by the lawyer with the client. Most
cases of dishonesty, when reported, are dealt with by
Courts and by the disciplinary committees. These re18

ceive maximum publicity and are significant in
shaping public opinions of the legal profession.
The challenges in the Courts and in the Congress to
self-regulation of the legal profession have usuaUy
resulted in efforts by the organized bar to move toward
easing particular grievances. For instance, the American Bar Association, as you know , relaxed the prohibitions against advertising to allow yellow page listings
prior to the Bates decision. 3 Also, the American Bar
Association after two or three years of heated debate
relaxed ethical prohibitions' that existed with regard to
closed panels for delivery of prepaid legal services. Efforts are being made to establish lawyer referral
services, to have lay participation in discipline and
judicial selection proceedings, to weight specialization, and ...... if not to adopt mandatory continuing legal
education-to broaden the concept and offering of
continuing legal education programs.
There are no ready answers to some of the questions I
have raised. Indeed in many instances we may not
know questions or answers until the Supreme Court
has decided pending cases I have discussed. There are,
however, two observations I should like to make that do
not involve judicial determination. They relate to the
process by which lawyers are educated, admitted to the
bar and practice. First, with few exceptions students are
admitted to law school, educated, take the bar, qualify
to practice and begin practice with no more than a
cursory investigation of character. It is true that letters
of recommendation are solicited for admission to law
school but these more often deal with academic qualifications than with character references. Students are
certified to take the bar examination on the basis of
representation by a Dean who is, in most instances,
limited in knowledge of an individual's character to the
exposure he might have had to the student. In recent
weeks cases have been reported where entire admissions
records were falsified at the Universities of South Carolina and Michigan. A year or so ago, the same student
was twice admitted to Harvard Law School, no mean
accomplishment, on false records since he had really
never obtained an undergraduate degree. We cannot
guarantee that there will not continue to be fraud and
abuse of the admissions process. However, I question
whether law schools, including the one with which I
am associated, are making sufficient effort through
alumni and officials at undergraduate schools to investigate the general character of applicants for the
practice of law. If lawyers are to continue in fidicuary
positions they have traditionally occupied, it is important that the bad apples be sorted out at the point of
entry. This is not a simple task. Rights of privacy,
consistent with the spirit of the bill of rights, should

continue to be respected. Nevertheless, additional ef·
forts by alumni and allocation of resources for
thorough admissions interviews are needed.
Secondly, although our disciplinary proceedings are
designed to punish the dishonest, there is nothing
within the disciplinary system that is designed to
measure competence. The Code of Professional Responsibility requires that lawyers report one another
for incompetence. I would not insult your intelligence
by pretending that this takes place. Disciplinary bodies
for the most part attempt to resolve complaints of
incompetence by having the lawyer straighten out the
matter rather than imposing sanctions. The Chairman
of a State Disciplinary Committee recently observed:
"I think that we have developed a 'live and
let live' philosophy. We really do not care
much about what our colleagues are doing
unless they cross us. There is a good deal of
talk among us about how we covet professionalism, but there is really not much indication
to me that we have any overwhelming concern
for the public interest in relation, at least, to
the activities of our fellow lawyers."
There are areas where one might identify quality
controls for the legal profession. The marketplace operates to allow consumers to decide by their purchasing
power who are good lawyers and who are not, so that
the less competent will ultimately be weeded out. I do
not believe that this is an effective means of insuring
quality or helping public perception of the legal profession. There is <\lso a sequence of steps required to
practice: admission to law school, satisfactory completion of law school requirements, passage of a bar
examination, admission to the bar, and in some jurisdictions, certification as a specialist. These are attempts
to assure quality of ultimate performance by limiting
those who may render service by examination and
formal requirements.
Another method of determining whether a practitioner is qualified will be tested by evaluation of a
particular professional service. The two principal
means of testing this are by professional discipline
systems and malpractice litigation. We have no present
methods of monitoring and improving the competence
of lawyers. Few disciplinary hearings are concerned
with competence. MalpractICe litigation is an expensive way to have one's incompetence questioned.
Some states are beginning to establish or consider
temporary licenses to practice. Such licenses are held
during a probationary period of two to three years
while the new lawyer's competency and ethical proclivities are observed. This is an additional limiting
step and its value will depend upon perfecting better

methods of monitoring and evaluating competence.
The temporary licensee would occupy a status similar
to the intern or resident in the medical profession.
In 1975 I was among a hundred conferees who assembled at Stanford to discuss law in a changing
society. The discussions were sponsored jointly by the
American Bar Association and the American Assembly.
None of the conclusions were revolutionary but a
general consensus evolved that has been confirmed by
developments since the conference took place. Some.of
these were recently summarized by Thomas Erlich, the
host Dean: It now appears predictable that by the end
of this century the number of nonlawyer personnel
who participate in the delivery of legal services will
exceed the number of lawyers. Economic pressures will
require the delegation of tasks to persons who are
specialized and can perform those tasks at lower costs
than all-purpose lawyers. The use of computers for
research purposes, already part of the operation of
many large city firms and bar organizations, will become standard equipment for most lawyers. There will
be increasing specialization by lawyers and possibly the
development of nationwide law firms. It is also predictable that the number of sole practitioners will
diminish rapidly. The demand for legal services will
require mass production techniques where recurring
common problems can be dealt with wholesale. None
of this seems overly visionary to me but in an age of Star
Wars and Close Encounters that may be understandable.
You might ask if this does not portend less need
when there are already too many lawyers. I do not
believe so. There are increasing areas of the law and
increasing need for legal service. We are becoming a
litigious breed. There remains a need for competent
lawyers.
I am certain some of these prospects disturb you for
the future of our profession. The legal profession is a
high calling and even when much of the very basis of
the profession as we have known it is threatened, we
retain a degree of self-regulation greater than any occupational endeavor in our economic system. It is true
that the traditional lawyer-client relationship will be
impaired and perhaps depersonalized by changes that
are taking place. Nevertheless, there remains within the
power of the practicing bar the capacity to direct much
of its fate, provided the public understands the valueof
a self-regulated, independent legal profession and the
unique demands of the adversary system.
If the legal profession fails in matters of legal education, discipline and the recognition of the need for
delivery of cost efficient legal care, it may be the instru(Continued on page 24)
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this nation well. On Law Day 1978, we should acknowledge the rich heritage of the rule of law in a free society
and understand that its continuation is dependent
upon the profession 's recognition of the multiple
responsibility lawyers have to clients, to the profession,
to the Courts and to the public-a weightier responsibility because of the complex and changing society in
which we live. This requires a greater sensitivity to the
need for better methods of delivering legal services.
And, also, efforts to demonstrate the value of our
profession to a questioning public. The best formula
for the latter is not new: it is to render prompt, competent and independent legal service for a reasonable
charge to each client represented.

FOOTNOTES

I. On Jul y 25, 1978 the Supreme Court o f Virginia amended Paragraph 10, Section IV of the Rul es for Integra tion of the Virginia Sta te
Bar, Part Six of the Rul es of Court to establi sh new procedures for
formul ati on and considera tion of advisory opinions by Virginia
State Bar committees and the Council o f th e Virgini a State Bar and,
also, providing for review o f certain advisory opinions by the
Supreme Court of Virginia and for an approved opinion to become a
Rul e of Court.
2. On May 30, 1978, th e Supreme Court affIrmed the disbarment of
Ohralik in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association 436 U.S. 447,
denying First Amendment protection for persona l solicitation by a
lawyer of clients in a hospital room. On the sa me day the Court
reversed and remanded In re Primus 436 U.S. 412, and held that a
state could not impose discip line upon a lawyer for advis ing a
woman of her lega l rights or writing to tell her that free lega l
assistance was available. The lawyer was associated with th e Carolina Community Law Firm in Columbia, South Carolina and the
Columbia bra nch of the Amer ica n Civil Liberties U nio n. Thus, the
Court has now held that some persona l so lici tati on is protected by
the First Amendment but the limits are no t yet defin ed.
It should be noted tha t in July of this yea rthe District of Columbia
Bar amended its disciplina ry rul es to permit in p erson soli ci tation ,
but prohibiting any right to pay a third p arty to seek busin ess for an
attorney.
The Boa rd of Govern o rs of the California Bar by a vote o f 12-6
adopted a proposed rul es change in August tha t a ll ows solicitation
under certa in co ndition s. T h e proposed change prohibits the use of
false or mi sleading statements; the use o f coercion , duress or harassment; a nd representations made when the potenti al client is in a
distressed state and cann ot exercise reasona ble j udgmenl. Members of
the California Bar are now consid ering the proposed change.

The Legal Profession
(Con tinued fro m page 19)

ment of its own demise. For over two centuries, lawyers
have been the balance wheels of our democracy. In
appointive posts, businesses, legislative bodies, on
school boards and in countless civic undertakings, they
have brought a measure of civility to civic and political
life and a capacity to probe and analyze that have served
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3. It shou ld be no ted tha t sho rtl y a ft er th e Bates decisio n, in
August o f 1977 , the H o use of Delega tes o f th e Amer ican Bar Assoc ia- '
tion adopted amendments to Canon 2 to a llow some pri ce
information in newspapers, periodicals and on radio. In August of
this year, the H o use of Delega tes amended the ABA code to permit
television advertising. Con seq uentl y, on August 30, 1978 the Justice
Department moved to dismiss its anti-trust suit aga inst th e American
Bar Association, fil ed on Jun e 25, 1976. The govern ment's compla int
had a lleged that the Am er ica n Bar Associa ti on was in viola tion of
Section One of the Sherman Act because it had adopted and was
enforcin g restri ctions on com petitive advertising by lawyers.

